Animal agency in the age of the Modern Synthesis: W.H. Thorpe's example by Radick, GM
Animal agency in the age of the Modern
Synthesis: W.H. Thorpe’s example
GREGORY RADICK*
Abstract. The mechanical and reductive ideals of much of modern science leave it ill-equipped
to recognize, let alone account for, the agency of animals. So says a tradition of criticism well
represented in the writings of the British behavioural biologist W.H. Thorpe FRS (1902–1986).
This paper recovers the range of overlapping debates and developments, philosophical and reli-
gious as well as scientiﬁc, which led Thorpe to champion animal agency in the period and place
much better known now as headquarters for the neo-Darwinian Modern Synthesis. A retracing
of Thorpe’s path through such forgotten domains as applied-science Lamarckism and the philo-
sophical psychology of Leonard Hobhouse complicates a now-standard picture (which Thorpe
himself promoted) of the Modern Synthesis as inimical to animal agency. Largely thanks to
Thorpe’s work, as publicized by Julian Huxley, the Modern Synthesis revitalized the fortunes
of what became one of the mainstays of agential science, the Baldwin effect.
I
What are ‘animal agents’? As a general rule, showing is better than telling. For me,
nothing better conveys the meaning of the phrase – and the provocative intent of
those who use it – than a passage in a 1965 book by the Cambridge entomologist-
turned-ethologist William H. Thorpe. Neither the book nor the man is especially well
remembered. When he wrote it, Thorpe was in his early sixties, and already some way
into that phase of a scientiﬁc career now derided as the ‘philosopause’. Science, Man
and Morals put into permanent form lectures he had given in Oxford in 1963, in an
annual series devoted to exploring the relationship between science and Christianity.
In the ﬁrst chapter, ‘The nature of life and the idea of Creation’, he unexpectedly
upends the familiar neo-Darwinian tale of the peppered moth in the industrially
darkened forests of Britain. Far from illustrating the power of natural selection to
adapt organisms to changing environments, the tale in Thorpe’s hands showcases the
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power of the animal to select its environment and thus to shape the evolutionary future
of its species:
[T]he pure Lamarckian conception has never been vindicated. But there is a form of it – or
rather what we might call a neo-Lamarckian theory – which is highly cogent. Firstly, there is
a continuous living interchange between the organism and its environment; and before an
organism’s environment can exert natural selection on it, the organism must select the environ-
ment to live in. That is, there is a feedback or cybernetic system in which there is nothing that is
simply cause and simply effect. It is useless for melanistic moths in industrial areas to become
darker unless they choose the dark patches to sit on, which in fact they do. Having made this
choice, natural selection [sic – the slip is the more unfortunate given the thrust of the passage]
can operate still further. In other words, with each new organ or change of structure, a corres-
ponding change of behaviour is likely to be necessary if the new development is to be a going
concern.1
The phrase ‘animal agents’ does not come up here. But it captures tolerably well
Thorpe’s stress on active choosing by animals as something to be taken seriously.
Elsewhere his language was explicitly agential, as in a 1950 lecture on evolution and
Christianity which I shall be dealing with at length below. It was his ﬁrst sustained
public statement as a theologically minded scientist, and one of its central messages
was the need to reconceptualize the animal under evolution by natural selection as ‘a
non-deterministic agent acting through the whole ecological complex of life and its
environment’.2
Among the many questions that historians of science might ask about animal agency is
the question of what prompts individuals, groups, sciences, eras to take it seriously (or not).
In seeking to understand how Thorpe came to ask about animal agency as and when he
did, we thus have the opportunity to learn new lessons not only about a particular sci-
entiﬁc world – that of the early- to mid-twentieth-century animal behaviour sciences, as
encountered by an especially thoughtful participant observer in Britain – but also about
the historical trajectory of animal agency as a scientiﬁc problem. We will see that
Thorpe’s work as champion of animal agency can be situated within what became two
of the great dissenting traditions in the animal behavioural sciences. One centres on
Lamarckian or, as Thorpe came to call it, neo-Lamarckian evolution. The other centres
on a kind of animal learning called insight learning. The common theme is that, where
animals are concerned, all is not purposeless mechanism. Placing Thorpe in relation to
these dissenting traditions, and seeing them as dissenting traditions – as, that is, clusters
of ideas and practices that stabilize as protest sciences (here, protest against mechanism)
– is one cluster of aims in what follows. Another is to uncover otherwise hidden bonds
between Thorpe the research scientist and Thorpe the public theologian. Ronald Fisher,
one of the architects of the neo-Darwinian Modern Synthesis and a senior colleague of
Thorpe’s at Cambridge, will turn out to offer some instructive contrasts.
I will return at the end to consider how a more vivid sense of Thorpe’s attentiveness to
animal agency might help us reassess a familiar picture of the Modern Synthesis as not
1 W.H. Thorpe, Science, Man and Morals, London: Scientiﬁc Book Club, 1965, pp. 15–16.
2 W.H. Thorpe, Evolution and Christian Belief, London: British Social Biology Council, 1951, p. 11. Also
published as an article in Biology and Human Affairs (1951) 17, pp. 6–19, 16.
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just inattentive to animal agency but annihilating of it. But I begin at the beginning,
which for Thorpe was the 1920s.
II
In late June 1927, in the improbable setting of the sleepy East Sussex beachside town of
St Leonards-on-Sea, the twenty-ﬁve-year-old Thorpe found himself giving his ﬁrst public
presentation on his research alongside the grandest of the grand old men in that era’s
debate on animal behaviour and Darwinian evolution. The occasion was the meeting
of the zoological section of the South-Eastern Union of Scientiﬁc Societies, gathering
for its three-day annual congress. Thorpe set down his recollection of the event half a
century later, in his book The Origins and Rise of Ethology (1979):
I was both uplifted and somewhat apprehensive to ﬁnd that the other two speakers sharing the
platform were Lloyd Morgan, who gave a critical evaluation of Eliot Howard’s work on terri-
tory in bird life, and Professor E.W. M[a]cBride, from the Imperial College of Science in
London, a great embryologist and zoologist, who was an indefatigable proponent of
Lamarckism. Both speakers were orotund and impressive. M[a]cBride was a pugnacious
Ulsterman who took sides on any subject with virulent intensity. One phrase has stuck in my
mind, ‘I have yet to see the Mendelian mutation which is not pathological.’3
BetweenMorgan andMacBride is not, as it happens, a bad way of imaging what Thorpe
came to stand for in the decades that followed. Brief introductions to the work of the
older men will prepare the ground for what follows.
Thorpe, looking back, called Morgan’s scientiﬁc contribution ‘so outstanding as to
warrant our considering him as one of the founding fathers of both comparative psych-
ology and ethology’. His foundational achievement par excellence, Thorpe explained,
was a rule of inference introduced by Morgan in the early 1890s and known ever
after as ‘Morgan’s canon’. Commanding human observers of animals to prefer whatever
interpretation of animal actions presumes the least of the powers of animal minds, the
canon was widely adopted within comparative psychology from around 1900
onward, as was a phrase little used before Morgan made it a book title in that year:
‘animal behaviour’. Morgan never approved of the behaviourist, mind-negating
extremes to which some American admirers took the experimental study of animal learn-
ing. But he remained convinced of the need to exercise great care in the difﬁcult business
of reaching justiﬁed claims about animal minds.4 At the 1927 meeting, under the title
‘Territory in bird life’, the seventy-plus-year-old set out his case once again, with some
new variations on familiar themes. Bird territoriality was the signature topic of Henry
Eliot Howard, a Worcester-based ﬁeld ornithologist who, as something of a protégé
of Morgan’s, had come as close as anyone had ever managed to putting Morgan’s
3 W.H. Thorpe, The Origins and Rise of Ethology: The Science of the Natural Behaviour of Animals,
London: Heinemann Educational, 1979, pp. 29–30. On the 1927 congress see ‘South-Eastern Union of
Scientiﬁc Studies: Annual Congress’, Nature (1927) 119, pp. 874–875.
4 Thorpe, op. cit. (3), pp. 26–29, 26; Gregory Radick, ‘Morgan, Conwy Lloyd (1852–1936)’, in Bernard
Lightman (ed.), Dictionary of Nineteenth-Century British Scientists, vol. 3, Bristol: Thoemmes Continuum,
2004, pp. 1425–1426.
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canon into practice in a way that the master found satisfactory. Even so, Howard’s latest
work provided Morgan with a chance to indulge his own signature topic of distinction-
making in the service of better interpretations. When we observe a male bird securing or
straying from his territory, we need, according to Morgan, to report what happened in
not one but three versions: a ‘plain-tale’, just-the-observed-facts version; a ‘body-story’
version, telling of how environmental stimuli combined with physiological states and
processes to produce movements of particular kinds; and a ‘mind-story’ version, rerun-
ning it again but in terms of perceptions, emotions, memory and other elements of the
bird’s inner life. The difﬁculties encountered in getting the body and mind stories
right, and then integrating them, will of course be daunting, Morgan warned. But he
nevertheless saw in their challenges a welcome spur to further inquiry and debate.5
Morgan’s talk at St Leonard’s-on-Sea drew on ideas expounded at greater length in his
most recent book, Life, Mind and Spirit (1926). It is tempting to see in the book, along
with its earlier companion volume Emergent Evolution, published in 1923, a manifesto
and even a map for the sort of gently Christian, extremism-avoiding, behaviour-and-evo-
lution-focused journeying that would absorb Thorpe so thoroughly for so much of his
later career. The two books memorializedMorgan’s Gifford Lectures in natural theology
at St Andrews in 1922–1923. As Morgan noted in his preface to Emergent Evolution,
they represented his most comprehensive statement of themes that had occupied him
ever since his days as a student in the laboratory of T.H. Huxley. Alone among
Darwin’s immediate circle, Huxley had seen no contradiction in believing both that
species evolve naturally and that nature makes occasional leaps. Morgan proposed
‘emergent evolution’ as a name for this position, stressing its credentials as a via
media that avoided the pitfalls of dogmatic mechanism on the one side and of supernat-
uralist vitalism on the other. It acknowledged that at certain points in the progress of
evolution, and by presumptively wholly natural means, genuine novelty – something
more than the mere summation of what was already in play – came about. In Life,
Mind and Spirit, Morgan urged that his canon now be understood as an extension to
the interpretation of animal behaviour of emergent evolution, as it enjoined the observer
not to attribute to animal minds faculties belonging to a later stage of evolution. As to
why nature should proceed in this progressive, stage-by-stage way, the ultimate
answer, Morgan reckoned, was that such was the workings of, in his term, ‘Divine
Purpose’. Life and mind were but earlier and later, physical and mental, manifestations
of the ultimate substance: spirit.6
5 C. Lloyd Morgan, ‘Territory in bird life’, Transactions of the South-Eastern Union of Scientiﬁc Societies
(1927), pp. 22–26. Of Howard, Morgan wrote, ‘Few equal him in accuracy of observation, in plain-tale
description, and in cautious interpretation with due regard to life-story and to mind-story.’ Morgan, Life,
Mind and Spirit, London: Williams and Norgate, 1926, p. 154. On Morgan and Howard see Richard
W. Burkhardt Jr, Patterns of Behavior: Konrad Lorenz, Niko Tinbergen, and the Founding of Ethology,
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2005, pp. 94–97.
6 C. Lloyd Morgan, Emergent Evolution, London: Williams and Norgate, 1923; Morgan, Life, Mind and
Spirit, op. cit. (5), esp. pp. 37 ff. for the animal behaviour ‘-story’ distinctions, 61 for the emergentist gloss on
the canon, and x for ‘Divine Purpose’. On Morgan’s writings in the emergentist tradition see David Blitz,
Emergent Evolution: Qualitative Novelty and the Levels of Reality, Kluwer: Dordrecht, 1992, Chapters 6–9.
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Exactly how familiar Thorpe was in 1927 with these larger philosophical and theo-
logical dimensions to Morgan’s work is unclear. But he certainly knew about
Morgan, who, aside from his professional standing in the ﬁeld that Thorpe was entering,
was a local celebrity in Thorpe’s home town of Hastings, right next to St Leonards-on-
Sea. Morgan had moved to Hastings after retirement from the University of Bristol in
1919. Thorpe in The Origins and Rise of Ethology remembered Morgan as a ‘striking
ﬁgure about the place, the most impressive feature being his white beard, which in retro-
spect seems to have been a yard long!’7
MacBride too had been seen in action earlier, at an event that Thorpe later recalled as
making the greatest impression on him of all of his undergraduate experiences. The occa-
sion was a lecture presented in April 1923 to the Cambridge Natural History Society by
the controversial Vienna zoologist Paul Kammerer on his experimental breeding
research in support of the Lamarckian inheritance of acquired characters, using
midwife toads and other animal species. Thorpe, then reading for an agriculture
degree at Jesus College, was one among a large number of undergraduates present, in
the company of J.B.S. Haldane and a number of Britain’s most senior zoologists, includ-
ingMacBride. By all accounts Kammerer, lecturing in English and exhibiting the few spe-
cimens that the war had spared, acquitted himself impressively. Even so, the debate
afterwards was vigorous, with MacBride, a long-time advocate of Lamarckian inherit-
ance in general and Kammerer’s experimental evidence for it in particular, stepping
forward as Kammerer’s defender. MacBride continued in that role in the months and
years that followed, even after, in the autumn of 1926, allegations of fraud against
Kammerer, and his subsequent suicide.8 If the odour of scandal still lingered over
Lamarckism when MacBride ascended the platform at St Leonard’s-on-Sea, he drew
no attention to it. At the start of his lecture, he noted that whereas his had once been
a lone voice in favour of Lamarckian evolution and Kammerer’s experiments, biological
consensus had now swung behind him. According to MacBride, it was now plain that
evolutionary change did not proceed by large-scale mutations à la the Mendelian-in-
chief William Bateson (Kammerer’s nemesis), nor by the small-scale chance variations
of Darwinian natural selection, but by heritable structural changes that came about in
response to altered environments. When habitual activity was involved, the structural
change was slow in coming but then permanent. Otherwise – and as in the cases he
examined through most of his lecture, to do with domesticated goldﬁsh – the change
was rapid but temporary and easily reversed.9
7 Thorpe, op. cit. (3), p. 29. For Thorpe’s biography see Gregory Radick, ‘Thorpe, William Homan’, in
Noretta Koertge (ed.), New Dictionary of Scientiﬁc Biography, vol. 7, Detroit: Charles Scribner’s Sons,
2008, pp. 42–45; and more extensively R.A. Hinde, ‘William Homan Thorpe 1902–1986’, Biographical
Memoirs of Fellows of the Royal Society (1987) 33, pp. 620–629.
8 On Kammerer’s lecture see Arthur Koestler, The Case of the Midwife Toad, London: Picador, 1971,
Chapter 7; for Thorpe’s testimonial see p. 70. On MacBride’s Lamarckism see Peter J. Bowler, ‘E.W.
MacBride’s Lamarckian eugenics and its implications for the social construction of scientiﬁc knowledge’,
Annals of Science (1984) 41, pp. 245–260, esp. 247–250.
9 E.W. MacBride, ‘The nature and origins of mutations’, Transactions of the South-Eastern Union of
Scientiﬁc Societies (1927), pp. 13–21.
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The horizon-sweepingMacBride addressed his audience as president of the Zoological
Section of the union. By unsurprising contrast, the neophyte Thorpe’s paper, ‘The fauna
of brackish pools of the Sussex coast’, was a narrowly focused affair. ‘The object of the
work’, he announced, ‘is to study the various forms of life, more especially the insects, in
relation to the changes in the salinity of the medium; and it is hoped, eventually to obtain
a fairly complete knowledge of the ecology of the locality’. Even so, what might in other
hands have been a humbly empirical, data-for-data’s-sake local survey, of little larger
consequence, turned out to be a point of entry into the major theoretical problem of
habitat extent – that is, of why animal habitats extend over the areas they do, and of
what enables or prevents animals from extending their habitats even further. The par-
ticular habitat extension puzzle which brackish water swirled around, Thorpe explained,
was the failure of freshwater insects to colonize marine water, though seemingly an
obvious next move in their evolutionary expansion. What held them back? Was it to
do with the sometimes greater salinity of boundary-marking brackish water compared
with marine water – the brackish water thus functioning as the ﬂuid equivalent of an
impassable mountain or gorge? Thorpe’s own investigations so far – including, he indi-
cated, some experiments – suggested otherwise, as they showed that some insect species,
and especially those belonging to more advanced, evolutionarily recent orders, tolerated
brackish conditions remarkably well. The puzzle, Thorpe reported to MacBride and the
rest of his audience, thus remained work in progress.10
Over the next ten years, Thorpe’s interests in habitat and the responses of animals to
its challenges brought him into ever closer contact with research into the evolutionary
consequences of habit – and even, brieﬂy, into friendly contact with the subject’s most
vocal Lamarckian exponent, MacBride. We turn next to consider Thorpe’s path
through the c.1930 debate over Lamarckism. His interventions and interactions are
worth tracking in a little detail. For one thing, his professional milieu – British, elite, zoo-
logical, on the border between theoretical and applied sciences – was far more open-
minded about the possibility of habitually acquired characters being inherited than
tends to be remembered now, when it is seen as the lost cause of Shavian romantics,
proto-Lysenkoist botanists and other assorted outliers (MacBride).11 For another,
although Thorpe’s own support for the inheritance of acquired characters was short-
lived and heavily hedged, he took away from this period a vivid sense of the easily over-
looked role in evolutionary change of animal action, and ultimately of purposive animal
10 W.H. Thorpe, ‘The fauna of brackish pools of the Sussex coast’, Transactions of the South-Eastern
Union of Scientiﬁc Societies (1927), pp. 27–34.
11 Cf. Marion J. Lamb, ‘Attitudes to soft inheritance in Great Britain, 1930s–1970s’, in Snait Gissis and Eva
Jablonka (eds.), Transformations of Lamarckism: From Subtle Fluids to Molecular Biology, Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press, 2011, pp. 109–120, esp. 110; Peter J. Bowler, The Eclipse of Darwinism: Anti-Darwinian
Evolution Theories in the Decades around 1900, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983, pp. 98–
106; and Richard W. Burkhardt Jr, ‘Lamarckism in Britain and the United States’, in Ernst Mayr and
William B. Provine (eds.), The Evolutionary Synthesis: Perspectives on the Uniﬁcation of Biology,
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980, pp. 343–352. An excellent starting point for anyone
wishing to explore the depth and breadth of scientiﬁc interest in Lamarckian inheritance c.1930 is the
discussion in Richard Levins and Richard Lewontin, ‘The problem of Lysenkoism’, in Levins and Lewontin,
The Dialectical Biologist, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985, pp. 163–196, 176–179.
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action. That the period was also a religiously intense one for him, as he began exploring
the Quaker faith that he would formally adopt in the mid-1940s, makes a closer look all
the more promising for insight into what followed.
III
After his public debut at St Leonards, Thorpe did well: studying in California on a
Rockefeller Fellowship (1927–1929), getting his PhD in agricultural science from
Cambridge (1929), and landing a job in the new parasite laboratory run by the Imperial
Bureau of Entomology in the Buckinghamshire village of Farnham Royal. He now had
a specialist area, biological control – an applied-science form of the habitat-extension ques-
tion – and within that area he had an organism, the ermine moth, Hypomeuta padella,
whose infestations occasionally brought fruit-tree orchards to ruin, but itself could
suffer curtailing infestations from parasites. In a series of ever-more-commanding publica-
tions, Thorpe reported and reﬂected upon experiments showing that the two main moth
variants – differing in colour and in habits but not in structure – amounted to distinct
species-in-the-making or ‘biological races’, their differences maintained via their preferen-
tial mating with like variants as well as their preferential feeding on different host plants,
apple trees or hawthorn trees. Placed in cages with diverse fruit-tree branches, moths from
apple-preferring parents more often than not chose apple for egg laying, and moths from
hawthorn-preferring parents more often than not chose hawthorn. These preferences,
moreover, appeared to be instinctual, in that they were not easily modiﬁed – only starva-
tion induced a larval moth to feed on the other sort of wood – and they manifested at egg-
laying time even in individuals that had not acquired the taste when young.12
What, if anything, did all of this mean for Lamarckism? In a 1929 paper, completed
before he took up his new position, Thorpe was guarded, noting similarities between his
studies and the recent, avowedly Lamarckian, experimental work of the Newcastle
biologist J.W. Heslop Harrison on egg-laying preferences in sawﬂies, but then dismissing
as ‘entirely speculation’ any thoughts about whether differential feeding patterns, kept
up over umpteen generations, might be the cause of the differentiating biologies or
whether the causation went the other way around.13 In a 1930 paper, however, he
went further, both in embedding his own results within a comprehensive survey of
recent work on biological races in insects and beyond, and in closing with a bravura
summary of the achievements of the burgeoning experimental literature on
Lamarckian inheritance. ‘In conclusion, then’, he wrote,
we may say that many of these experiments are easily explained on some form of Lamarckian
theory, but extremely difﬁcult to account for on any other lines. If the hypothesis were not such
a debatable one the evidence might well be regarded as almost conclusive for, to quote
12 I am indebted in this section to the pioneering coverage of this period of Thorpe’s career in Burkhardt, op.
cit. (5), pp. 339–341.
13 W.H. Thorpe, ‘Biological races in Hypomeuta padella L.’, Journal of the Linnean Society of London,
Zoology (1929) 36, pp. 621–634, 633; J.W. Heslop Harrison, ‘Experiments on the egg-laying instincts of
the sawﬂy, Potania salicis Christ., and their bearing on the inheritance of acquired characters; with some
remarks on a new principle of evolution’, Proceedings of the Royal Society B (1927) 101, pp. 115–126.
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Thompson and Parker (1928), ‘it is probably the only intelligible theory of a natural evolution-
ary process ever advanced.’ It seems equally certain, however, that none of the experiments
recorded in these pages has been on a sufﬁciently extensive scale to carry complete conviction
on the point. They do, however, suggest most proﬁtable ﬁelds for further work of this nature
and, taken together, they provide a quite considerable amount of the ever-growing body of cir-
cumstantial evidence for the theory.14
‘Thompson’ here was Thorpe’s boss at Farnham Royal, William R. Thompson, an
Ontario-born agricultural entomologist. In an obituary notice of Thompson, Thorpe
recalled that biological races and Lamarckian inheritance were the topics of their most
memorable work discussions. But they also met up often at the older man’s home for
marathon evening conversations on philosophy, in particular the neo-scholastic stance
on science that Thompson had been developing for some years, and which would take
public form in his book Science and Common Sense: An Aristotelian Excursion.
Philosophically, Thompson disapproved of the role that Darwinian theory assigned to
chance, on the view that the resulting theory was so alien from common-sense ways
of understanding the world as to be unintelligible. Empirically, too, Thompson regarded
the recent run of experimental studies of host preferences as sufﬁciently suggestive as to
warrant a much wider and more rigorous programme of research into the inheritance of
acquired characters. Even so, according to Thorpe, when Thompson saw the draft of the
paper quoting him and his collaborator H.L. Parker to pro-Lamarckian effect, he was
not encouraging, citing the professional difﬁculties that might hamper Thorpe’s career
as a result. Thorpe ignored the advice (which may well, one suspects, have been given
in reverse-psychological spirit).15
While he also gave Thompson’s form of Catholicism a wide berth, it was in just this
period of philosophical–religious companionship that Thorpe, raised a Congregationalist,
began attending Quaker meetings, at a Friends’ Meeting House down the road from
Farnham Royal. It would be as easy to read too much as too little into this conjunction.
At the one extreme, there is no reason at all to think that incipient Lamarckism quick-
ened Thorpe’s interest in Quakerism or vice versa, much less to hunt up parallels and
resonances that might explain how, for Thorpe at least, Quakerism and Lamarckism
came to seem a singularly good ﬁt for each other. But at the other extreme, it would
be naive to suppose that someone as thoughtful as Thorpe would have seen no connec-
tions between his new scientiﬁc explorations and his new religious explorations. The
vague assertion of one of his obituarists, in the Quaker journal The Friend, that it ‘is
not without signiﬁcance that his total commitment to Friends [in 1945] and to the
study of animal behaviour happened at the same time’, seems about right. It is likewise
not without signiﬁcance that in 1930, when his earliest animal behaviour work led him
to ally himself publicly with the community of Lamarckians and so to risk opprobrium
for a modest form of scientiﬁc heresy, he made his ﬁrst visits to a community of Christian
14 W.H. Thorpe, ‘Biological races in insects and allied groups’, Biological Reviews of the Cambridge
Philosophical Society (1930) 5, pp. 177–212, 208, quoting from W.R. Thompson and H.L. Parker, ‘Host
selection in Pyrausta nubialis, Hübn.’, Bulletin of Entomological Research (1928) 18, pp. 359–364, 360.
15 W.H. Thorpe, ‘William Robin Thompson 1887–1972’, Biographical Memoirs of Fellows of the Royal
Society (1973) 19, pp. 654–678, esp. 661–662. Science and Common Sense was published in 1937.
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believers who, though belonging to the same Dissenting spectrum as his parents, stood
well outside the tradition he was raised in.16
In March 1931, Thorpe, now his late twenties, gave a talk on his latest work to the
Association of Economic Biologists in London, at Imperial College –MacBride’s insti-
tution. He was there, and a few weeks later asked Thorpe a favour wrapped in a fan
letter. MacBride explained that, having ‘had the privilege of hearing you’ deliver an
address in which MacBride was ‘deeply interested’, he was writing to ask for references
to some of the cases that Thorpe had mentioned – presumably cases of the sort dis-
cussed at the end of Thorpe’s 1930 paper, reporting the successful production of
new races and even species by the experimental inducing of inheritable changes of
habit. ‘I have undertaken to give a lecture in the Royal Institution on June 5 on
“Habit the driving force in Evolution”’, MacBride went on, ‘and I shall like to show
them some new slides’. To judge by a further letter from MacBride a little more than
a week later, Thorpe’s letter back was received with gratitude, prompting a further
request from MacBride for information about illustrations relating to one of the
cases that had featured in the Imperial address, involving the experimental transform-
ation of head lice into body lice by the Quick Professor of Biology at Cambridge,
George Nuttall.17
MacBride’s Royal Institution lecture, subsequently published as a special supplement
in Nature, marshalled Thorpe’s work in support, along with Nuttall’s and Heslop
Harrison’s. For MacBride, studies such as theirs, concentrating on the life histories of
individual organisms, constituted one of three kinds of investigation throwing light on
the process of evolution, along with locality studies dealing with different races in a
single species and with different species in a single fossil lineage. All of the accumulated
evidence so far, MacBride judged, was consistent with the view of ‘Neo-Lamarckism’
(his term) that change in environments causes organisms to adopt new habits, which
in turn generate the inheritable structural changes that make for the gradual evolution
recorded in the rocks. It was also becoming clearer how, at the cellular level, such
habit-induced structural changes could become inheritable. At the same time, according
to MacBride, evidence was mounting against the Darwinian view that the process goes
the other way, with spontaneously changed structures accidentally producing the adap-
tive habits that ﬁt fortunate individuals and their offspring more tightly to their changed
environments. In making his negative case, he laid particular stress on the ‘pure-line’
experiments of Wilhelm Johannsen and others, as showing that normally arising vari-
ation is not inheritable, against the expectations of August Weismann and the other
arch-Darwinians. ‘The doctrine of the inheritance of acquired characters is by no
means so dead as its opponents thought a generation ago’, trumpeted the Nature
16 Anna M. Bidder, ‘William Thorpe’, The Friend, 16 May 1986, pp. 621–622, 621. Bidder says (at 621)
that Thorpe applied for membership in the Friends in 1945, and Hinde, in his obituary, op. cit. (7), p. 630, that
ﬁfteen years before Thorpe had begun attending meetings while working at Farnham Royal.
17 Letters from E.W. MacBride to W.H. Thorpe, 21 April and 1 May 1931, in the Papers of W.H. Thorpe,
Manuscripts Reading Room, Cambridge University Library, Add.8784, Box (aka ‘Set’) 6, ‘M’ sheaf. The lice
experiments were reported in G.H.F. Nuttall, ‘The systematic position, synonymy and iconography of
Pediculus humanus and Phthirus pubis’, Parasitology (1919) 11, pp. 329–346.
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editorial in the issue carrying the lecture. Although there was room for disagreement
about whether all of the experiments that MacBride discussed bore the weight of his
neo-Lamarckian interpretation, ‘we view with sympathy his championship of the direct-
ive force of the organism in the evolutionary race’.18
But within professional biology, the tide was moving in the other direction. Between
1930 and 1932, R.A. Fisher, Sewall Wright and J.B.S. Haldane published work swiftly
regarded as having put Darwinian natural selection theory on a newly secure, mathem-
atically impressive, population-genetical foundation. Haldane spelled out the conse-
quences for neo-Lamarckism unsparingly in a Royal Institution lecture in the spring
of 1932. Framed as an answer to MacBride’s 1931 lecture, and likewise published after-
wards in Nature, Haldane’s ‘The hereditary transmission of acquired characters’ made
quick work of the experimental evidence that MacBride had exhibited. All of it, in
Haldane’s view, could be explained as due to the effects of unintentional selection, as
when the transfer of larvae to an unaccustomed foodstuff functions to kill off all but
the individuals with favourably disposing genetic variation. As for pure-line experi-
ments, the conclusion to draw from them was not that Darwinian change in nature
failed to happen, but that evolutionary change of whatever sort, Darwinian or
Lamarckian, could not take place within a genetically uniform population. The challenge
for the Lamarckian theorist, Haldane went on, was to identify a form of evolutionary
change in a genetically mixed population which could not be explained as due to selec-
tion. Furthermore, in rising to that challenge, the Lamarckian would do well to disown
the popular notion that there was something upliftingly vitalist about the inheritance of
acquired characters and something depressingly mechanical about natural selection.
Vitalism or mechanism can go just as easily with the one process as with the other, or
with neither (Haldane’s agnostic preference), according to intellectual taste. Those
seeking for cosmic consolation from biological theory can, Haldane advised, surely
ﬁnd it more easily in the view that, up to now, evolution’s slow, blood-soaked progress
cannot be blamed on minds driving the process in that way on purpose.19
Neither Thorpe – who left Farnham Royal in 1932 for a lectureship at Cambridge –
nor anyone else with a stake in Lamarckism seems to have taken Haldane’s advice. Be
that as it may, within a few years Thorpe was ﬁrmly on Haldane’s side of the question
of the inheritance of acquired characters, though retaining, as a legacy from the
Lamarckian excursions of the Farnham Royal days, an abiding interest in animal activity
as an evolutionary cause in its own right. Both the shift and the survival are plain in a
1937 paper with a junior colleague at Cambridge, F.G.W. Jones, entitled ‘Olfactory
18 E.W. MacBride, ‘Habit: the driving force of evolution’, Supplement to Nature (20 June 1931) 127,
pp. 933–944, 942 on Thorpe; 940 on the differences between Lamarck’s views and Neo-Lamarckism.
Editorial quotations from the ﬁrst item in the ‘News and views’ section, Nature, 20 June 1931, p. 946.
19 J.B.S. Haldane, ‘The hereditary transmission of acquired characters’, Nature, 4 and 11 June 1932,
pp. 817–819, 856–858. For Fisher’s critical remarks on Lamarckism around the same time see, for example,
R.A. Fisher, ‘Inheritance of acquired characters’, Nature, 15 October 1932, p. 579; Fisher, ‘Indeterminism
and natural selection’, Philosophy of Science (1934) 1, pp. 99–117, esp. 109–112; and Fisher, ‘Adaptation
and mutations’, School Science Review (1934) 1, pp. 294–301, esp. 295–297 – all gathered in Collected
Papers of R.A. Fisher, vol. 3 (ed. J.H. Bennett), Adelaide: University of Adelaide, 1973.
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conditioning in a parasitic insect and its relation to the problem of host selection’. The
body of the paper reported a series of experiments making use of an olfactometer – basic-
ally a glass tube choice chamber for insects, which, by heading left or right at a junction
point, express a preference for one smell over another – conducted in order to get more
precise data on a phenomenon recently established by Thorpe: that in insect parasites
which identify their usual host by smell, individuals reared on the larvae of an alternative
host contaminated with the smell of the usual host will later on, as egg-laying adults,
show on average a weakened preference for the usual host. In one trial, as per
Lamarckian expectations, a greater proportion of individuals in the eighth generation
preferred the alternative host than in the ﬁrst generation. The difference, however,
was not statistically signiﬁcant, and in another trial the proportion expressing the
acquired preference actually got smaller. ‘It is quite clear’, wrote Thorpe and Jones in
summary, ‘that the work so far gives no indication of any inheritance of acquired char-
acters’. But that did not mean, they went on, that olfactory conditioning had no evolu-
tionary signiﬁcance. On the contrary, even a small amount of it could, under natural
conditions, sufﬁce to form an ‘ecological barrier’, isolating one sub-population from
another. Once such a barrier exists, conditions are ripe for the emergence and preserva-
tion of genetic changes that might make the acquired preferences hereditary – a pseudo-
Lamarckian process ﬁtfully known to that point as ‘organic selection’ and later on as ‘the
Baldwin effect’, but with several co-discoverers in the late 1890s, among them Conwy
Lloyd Morgan.20
These themes became ever more pronounced in Thorpe’s work during the war years,
which he spent in England as a conscientious objector.21 Via Julian Huxley’s enthusiastic
coverage in his Evolution: The Modern Synthesis (1942), the Baldwin effect and
Thorpe’s empirical conﬁrmations of it went on to become still more general themes,
as I will consider more fully in the ﬁnal section. But to stay with Thorpe himself for
the moment, the war years saw him delve ever more deeply into the scientiﬁc literature
on animal learning – a literature that counted as a near neighbour to the one he contrib-
uted to with his work on olfactory conditioning and host selection.22 It is time to con-
sider in more detail his encounter with the sciences of animal mind and behaviour,
especially those forms in dissent from a vision of the animal as a stimulus–response
machine.
20 W.H. Thorpe and F.G.W. Jones, ‘Olfactory conditioning in a parasitic insect and its relation to the
problem of host selection’, Proceedings of the Royal Society B (1937) 124, pp. 56–80, 78. On how J.M.
Baldwin rather than Morgan or H.F. Osborn came to be remembered as the discoverer of organic selection
see Robert J. Richards, Darwin and the Emergence of Evolutionary Theories of Mind and Behavior,
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1987, pp. 480–495.
21 See, for example, W.H. Thorpe, ‘Ecology and the future of systematics’, in Julian Huxley (ed.), The New
Systematics, London: Oxford University Press, 1940, pp. 341–364; Thorpe, ‘Animal learning and evolution’,
Nature (14 July 1945) 156, p. 46; Thorpe, ‘The evolutionary signiﬁcance of habitat selection’, Journal of
Animal Ecology (1945) 14, pp. 67–70.
22 In a footnote in his 1930 paper, Thorpe observed that while the term ‘biological races’ was better than
‘physiological races’ for capturing the sense of differences based in preferences rather than structures, he
followed his boss Thompson in regarding ‘psychological’ as better still, especially for insects; Thorpe, op.
cit. (14), p. 180.
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IV
The effects of that encounter on Thorpe’s research ambitions became publicly visible in
an extraordinary suite of six articles that he published in 1943 on animal learning – an
impressive start to a project in self-education that culminated in 1956 in his professional
masterpiece, Learning and Instinct in Animals. To appreciate the connections that he
saw between his new interests in animal learning and his evolving evolutionary and reli-
gious commitments, however, we do better ﬁrst to consider something earlier and
unpublished: a long letter of September 1941 to the Cambridge-based
Congregationalist minister and theologian John S. Whale, whose recent open lectures
on Christian doctrine at the university had just been published. Thorpe wrote to con-
gratulate Whale on the marvellous job he had done but also to raise a few queries.
One line of questioning concerned the light thrown by the theory of evolution on the
nature of sin – a topic that Whale dealt with at length. But where Whale had rejected
evolutionary theory as offering no explanation whatsoever for why man is sinful,
Thorpe reckoned that the theory offered exactly the explanation that Christians seek,
since it depicts man’s mind as mostly not under his control. On an evolutionary under-
standing, wrote Thorpe,
by far the greater part of [human] mental structure appears to have been produced by and
adapted to solving the problems involved in survival as an animal. Psychologically the Will
… has in every man all the time everywhere to contend with the great mass of inherited
mental structure which morally speaking, is sheer dead weight.
The real theological puzzle, he went on, is not why we are sinful, but why we are so
sinful, in that we might well have had a better-functioning moral sense. For a helpful
statement of the problem, if not of the solution, Thorpe recommended Leonard
Hobhouse: ‘There is something in what Hobhouse says – “Perhaps the real difﬁculty
is to imagine a mind which could make us living beings so well but not make us
better.” But this is part of the mystery central in the whole universe and its existence
and development in time.’23
No thinker on animal agency mattered more for Thorpe than Hobhouse. Appointed
to the ﬁrst chair in sociology in Britain (at the London School of Economics), Hobhouse
was, from 1907 until his death in 1929, a leading light of British liberalism. He assumed
that role, however, as the most energetic and inﬂuential British successor to Herbert
Spencer, with a career – and ultimately a collected works – that resembled an updating
of Spencer’s attempt systematically to recast the whole of human knowledge on evolu-
tionary terms. For Hobhouse, evolution was a literally mind-expanding process that,
with the arrival of humans, had become self-conscious and, potentially, self-directing,
to morally and spiritually uplifting ends. Thorpe never lost an opportunity to stress
the depth of his intellectual debt. In his Gifford Lectures, Animal Nature and Human
23 Letter from W.H. Thorpe to J.S. Whale, 22 September 1941, Thorpe Papers, Box 8, Bundle i, Folder 1;
J.S. Whale, Christian Doctrine, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1941. I have not identiﬁed the source
of the quotation from Hobhouse (if indeed it is a quotation), but it is in keeping with the discussion in his
Morals in Evolution, 2 vols., London: Chapman & Hall, 1906, vol. 2, pp. 127–141.
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Nature, delivered in 1969–1971 and published in 1974, in a section entitled ‘The refu-
tation of reductionism’, he testiﬁed, ‘Amongst philosophers and logicians, particularly
amongst those who have given special attention to scientiﬁc problems, many names
could be mentioned, including that great thinker L.T. Hobhouse, whom I like to
mention ﬁrst because I owe so much to his writings.’24
Thorpe knew the wider oeuvre. But two door-stopper books on evolution became
especially important. Mind in Evolution (1901; second edition 1915) commandingly
set forth both a new theory of the multiple stages by which mind had grown in power
over the course of animal evolution and the evidence in favour of that theory, including
evidence from animal learning experiments that Hobhouse had conducted himself at
Belle Vue zoological gardens in Manchester. A major target was the young American
psychologist Edward Thorndike, whose recently published puzzle-box experiments –
in which he had placed hungry cats and monkeys in specially designed crates, timed
the animals’ efforts to open the doors and get the food just beyond, and interpreted
the results in strict accord withMorgan’s canon – appeared to show that intelligent activ-
ity by animals was always due to blind trial-and-error learning. Hobhouse responded
with a different set of experiments where success could not come about gradually by
trial and error but only because, more or less suddenly, the animal understood
enough about its situation to act deliberately, on purpose. The iconic version of these
experiments – chimps stacking boxes to get at a banana suspended overhead – was
due to the later work of the German gestalt psychologist Wolfgang Köhler, who inﬂuen-
tially introduced the word ‘insight’ to name the mental capacity called upon, of grasping
the relations between the objects seen. But Köhler modelled his experiments and analysis
closely on those of Hobhouse. And for Hobhouse, they served his larger argument on the
progressive, upwards-by-degrees character of mental evolution, with each successive
stage bringing not merely increase in the ability to frame and handle ideas but also con-
comitant growth in moral capacity and harmonious action. Under natural selection, pro-
gress had been slow. But now, with mind taking over as the driving force, producing ever
improving understanding of the internal and external conditions on which its progress
depends, the prospect of rapid further advance was achievable as never before.25
Mind in Evolution ended with some reﬂections on how the evolutionary process
Hobhouse had described was neither mechanical nor teleological but something untidily
in between. Spelling out that third option in more detail was the burden ofDevelopment
and Purpose: An Essay towards a Philosophy of Evolution (1913; second edition 1927).
24 W.H. Thorpe, Animal Nature and Human Nature, London: Methuen, 1974, pp. 349, 45. See too, for
example, Thorpe, Biology and the Nature of Man, London: Oxford University Press, 1963, pp. 54, 109;
Thorpe, Biology, Psychology and Belief, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961, p. 44; and as
discussed in the next section, Thorpe, op. cit. (2), pp. 8 (pamphlet), 13 (article). On Hobhouse see Gregory
Radick, The Simian Tongue: The Long Debate about Animal Language, Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press, 2007, pp. 211–214; and Chris Renwick, British Sociology’s Lost Biological Roots: A
History of Futures Past, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, esp. pp. 98–120, 170–180.
25 L.T. Hobhouse,Mind in Evolution, London: Macmillan, 1901; Radick, op. cit. (24), pp. 214, 222–223.
Morgan later credited Hobhouse and successors such as Köhler with having shown that apes and to a lesser
extent monkeys had reached a higher mental level of ‘sub-rational’ foreplanning. Morgan, Life, Mind and
Spirit, op. cit. (5), pp. 211–212.
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Thorpe revered it, and rightly so. The aim was to show that two independent lines of
investigation – the inductive study of the evolution of life and the deductive analysis
of the operations of reason – converge on a picture of reality as a developing work-in-
progress, characterized by an ever greater degree of harmony across parts which are
ever more fully integrated into ever more comprehensive wholes. In Hobhouse’s view,
when we understand that harmony is the goal of life as much as it is the goal of
reason, we understand not only why purely mechanical explanations, making no refer-
ence to purpose, never seem adequate, but also why our judgement of that inadequacy
can be trusted as correct. So how, then, should we put together mechanism and tele-
ology? A clear statement of the solution was, at this mid-point in the world process,
with both reality and the human mind’s grasp of it still under development, beyond
human reach. But Hobhouse’s best shot at a summing up was in a phrase that Thorpe
came to cherish: ‘conditioned purpose’. Purpose was as real as mechanical cause and
effect but operated under the latter’s constraints, under the conditions it imposed. The
growth of mind over the evolutionary long run belonged to the still-longer-run story
of the growth of purpose’s mastery over conditioning mechanism. There was even, for
Hobhouse, a new understanding here of God, as ‘that of which the highest known
embodiment is the distinctive spirit of Humanity’, itself understood ‘as the spirit of
harmony and expanding life, shaping the best actions of the best men and women’.26
Hobhouse the holistic thinker on animal mind made an appearance further on in
Thorpe’s 1941 letter to Whale, in a remarkable paragraph worth quoting in full. It
shows, ﬁrst of all, how fully Thorpe already identiﬁed with biologists and psychologists
in a broadly Hobhousian mould, insistent that animals are not at all the stimulus–
response machines presumed in the work of the American behaviourists who followed
on from Thorndike. Among the virtuous for Thorpe, alongside Hobhouse, were
Henry Eliot Howard and E.S. Russell in Britain, the Lamarckian William McDougall
in the USA (a transplanted Brit), the German gestalt psychologists, the Dutch zoologist
J.A. Bierens de Haan, and the Austrian zoologist Konrad Lorenz, whose work with
another Dutchman, Niko Tinbergen, to deﬁne a new, bird-focused biological science
of animal instinct and instinct-conditioned learning – ethology – would give a new dir-
ection to Thorpe’s research career in the postwar years. (Thorpe referred to the above
under the banner of a now unfamiliar term, ‘hormic psychology’, popular in the
1920s. Roughly speaking, if you wanted to interpret animal behaviour as the upshot
not of mechanism but of mind, then hormism – from the Greek for ‘impulse’, horme –
was for you.)27 But the paragraph is also revealing of how readily Thorpe connected
the dots between the richer notion of animal mental life that these admired men defended
and the need to recognize the capacity of animals for pain and suffering – something that,
much later, he would take pioneering political action to alleviate:
26 L.T. Hobhouse, Development and Purpose: An Essay towards a Philosophy of Evolution, London:
Macmillan, 1913, pp. xxvi, 371.
27 On hormism seeMorgan, Life, Mind and Spirit, op. cit. (5), pp. 87–93; also J.C. Flugel,AHundred Years
of Psychology 1833–1933, London: Duckworth, 1933, pp. 270–278. As Flugel stressed, hormic psychology
was identiﬁed most closely with McDougall, who was increasingly well known for Lamarckism-afﬁrming
learning experiments with rats (see ibid., p. 278).
48 Gregory Radick
https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/bjt.2017.8
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Leeds, on 26 Apr 2018 at 09:31:41, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
One more matter connected with Comparative Psychology… You probably know that the ten-
dency is to assign a bigger and bigger role to conation and purpose in animal behaviour. There
seems no getting away from the ‘hormic psychology’ of Bierens de Haan, Russell, McDougall,
Hobhouse etc. These and the Gestalt psychologists seem to have brought about not merely the
decay but the ﬁnal dissolution of ‘Behaviourism’. Now obviously one must be extremely cau-
tious about attributing mental states to animals; behaviourism was itself a natural reaction
from a crude anthropomorphic view. Obviously we can never know the animal mind directly.
But we have reached the stage now when it seems utterly perverse to deny some kind of con-
sciousness, emotion and purpose at least to the higher vertebrate animals. As the work of
Eliot Howard, Lorenz and many others seem[s] to show, much of bird behaviour is utterly
meaningless without supposing certain emotions very similar to ours and some sort of con-
sciousness seems indubitable in the higher mammals at least. (Although ‘consciousness’ is a
term which some animal psychologists equate with ‘experience’; to my mind unjustiﬁably.) If
then the present day comparative psychologists are right I think it follows that there must be
in Nature a great amount of pain and suffering, some of it apparently meaningless. This suffer-
ing will of course be very different to and very much less than human suffering in that appre-
hension is probably almost if not entirely lacking. But still it seems as if it must be there to some
extent, even if only momentarily. I take it that it is the essence of true religion that it ultimately
makes sense of the human suffering in the world; if it does not do so it fails ﬁnally. Religion can
make sense of human suffering because man is a moral being and has something divine in his
nature. But what of the animals? Are they too capable of salvation? And what of human and
sub-human suffering prior to the coming of revealed religion? Are we to regard the travail of the
whole creation justiﬁed because it was able at last to give rise to man? This seems to present
such a terrifying picture of God that the mind instinctively recoils from it. The ‘natural
world’ seems after all a mixture of good and evil as does the ‘human world’ but lacking any
hope of salvation. As long as one could regard animals as exquisitely beautiful automata, all
was well. As I say we can never be sure in the sense of having strict proof, but the old view
does seem less and less tenable.28
Two years later, in 1943, Thorpe published those six animal-learning articles. Three of
them were successive parts of a single survey, ‘Types of learning in insects and other
arthropods’, which included discussion of insight learning, noting Hobhouse’s role in
its study. The tone is strikingly sympathetic, with Thorpe at one point suggesting that
‘an enormous amount of so-called trial and error learning of the higher vertebrates
does in fact involve insight at some stage’.29 Another of his papers that year reported
his own ﬁrst observation of learning in a higher vertebrate: a great tit who had landed
on the bird table in his garden in Cambridge. In a sort of upside-down version of the
box-stacking experiment with chimps, the bird in Thorpe’s set-up – not, it seems, delib-
erately contrived, but just an ordinary feature of the table – had to pull up a thread in
stages, holding the pulled-in loop in its foot, in order to get at a cheese rind suspended
at the bottom. ‘I was greatly impressed by the smooth ease and certainty, and the
entire absence of fumbling, with which the complete act was accomplished in a matter
of a few seconds’, wrote Thorpe. The act thus bore, he went on, all the hallmarks of
28 Letter from W.H. Thorpe to J.S. Whale, 22 September 1941, Thorpe Papers, Box 8, Bundle i, Folder 1,
emphases in original. On Thorpe’s animal welfare work see David A.H. Wilson, ‘Animal psychology and
ethology in Britain and the emergence of professional concern for the concept of ethical cost’, Studies in
History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences (2002) 33, 235–261, esp. 249–251, 256.
29 W.H. Thorpe, ‘Types of learning in insects and other arthropods’ (I), British Journal of Psychology
(1943) 33, pp. 220–235, esp. 222–224, 224; Thorpe, ‘Types of learning in insects and other arthropods’
(II–III), British Journal of Psychology (1944) 34, 20–31, 66–76.
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insight learning: ‘a real solution of a problem, distinguishing means and ends, based on
apprehension of the essential relations in a situation and not upon the slow method of
“Trial and Error”’.30
V
Twice over, the end of the Second World War marked a ‘before’ and ‘after’ for Thorpe.
Before, he was an economic entomologist, specializing in crop pests and their parasites.
After, he was an ethologist, specializing in birds and the experimental study of the inter-
play of instinct and learning in song acquisition. Before, he was a Congregationalist
strongly attracted to Quakerism. After, he was a formal member of the Society of
Friends. As we have seen, animal learning, and especially that part of it concerned
with animals as purposefully acting agents, not mere machines, served to bridge not
only the two parts of his scientiﬁc career but also his professional, scientiﬁc self and
his personal, Christian self. The latter interconnections, however, remained a private
matter, for discussions and correspondence, until the end of 1950, when Thorpe deliv-
ered his lecture on ‘Evolution and Christian belief’, from which I quoted near the start
(on the animal under natural selection as ‘a non-deterministic agent acting through
the whole ecological complex of life and its environment’).
The occasion was an invitation to address a conference in London on evolution and
education, organized by groups headed up by the British Social Biology Council. But
the more important releaser, as the ethologists used to say, was the Eddington Lecture
earlier that year by his Cambridge colleague Ronald Fisher, ‘Creative aspects of
natural law’. Fisher took aim at the oft-repeated allegation that organic evolution as
understood by neo-Darwinians like him was an uncreative and dispiriting process.
Fisher diagnosed two mistakes at work here. One was the failure to appreciate that,
according to the best recent physical science, all natural causation is indeterministic
and so, to that extent, creative. Any causal system might well have been different
from what it is. The other mistake – and, Fisher reckoned, it was the emotionally and
morally resonant one – was to suppose that there must be something more to evolution-
ary creativity than what natural selection alone can accomplish, and/or that natural
selection requires supplementing by a Bergsonian élan vital, a Lamarckian willing, a
dash of Smutsian holism, or some other kind of magic extra if it is to be creative. But
the magical extras do not exist, Fisher insisted, and even if they did exist, they would
not explain the facts about evolution as we know them. By contrast, not only does
natural selection, acting on natural genetic variation, explain what needs explaining,
but also its means and ends, when viewed in the right way, fully satisfy cravings for evo-
lution to be upliftingly creative. Under natural selection, and in parallel with some
Christian teachings, it is the success or failure of the organism’s enterprise, its commerce
with the world, which counts. And that success or failure in turn can contribute
30 W.H. Thorpe, ‘A type of insight learning in birds’, British Birds (1943) 37, pp. 29–31, 29; with a follow-
up paper the next year: Thorpe, ‘Further notes on a type of insight learning in birds’, British Birds (1944) 38,
pp. 46–49.
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creatively to the bringing about of new species, as when the extinction of the dinosaurs
opened up new possibilities for mammals. (‘Who knows’, wondered Fisher, ‘if the
mammals would ever have evolved, but for the creative activity of the dinosaurs!’)
Indeed, at a time of growing awareness of human responsibility for extinction, there
was scope too, Fisher urged, for creative new efforts by humans to preserve old
species, and more generally to protect our fellow creatures from harm.31
Thorpe in his lecture warmly endorsed this vision of creative, Christian Darwinism.
But his route to and from that destination was distinctively that of a Hobhouse-
reading, ex-Lamarckian behavioural zoologist. After some opening reﬂections on afﬁn-
ities between Christianity and science in general, biology in particular, and the idea of an
evolutionary family tree especially, he turned to Christian suspicions about natural selec-
tion, notably that it was wasteful, cruel, blind and amoral. The ﬁrst two charges he dis-
patched easily enough. Natural selection looks wasteful only on the unacceptably
anthropocentric view that humans are what the whole process is for, and cruel only
on an outmoded understanding of natural selection as rewarding success in mortal
combat rather than differential reproduction, coupled with an exaggerated estimate of
animals’ abilities to anticipate and dread the far future. But the alleged blindness of
natural selection he found more problematic. Yes, loose talk about the ‘randomness’
of variations introduced confusions that were easily dissolved. Another source of confu-
sion, however, was a deeply rooted but increasingly untenable conception of the organ-
ism as a mindless machine. ‘I see no escape’, wrote Thorpe,
from the view of living animals as psycho-physical systems. This is the conclusion reached by
that undeservedly neglected philosopher, L.T. Hobhouse, who in his great work,Development
and Purpose, deﬁnes purposive behaviour as ‘the conditioning of the action of each part of a
system by the causal tendency of the conﬁguration as a whole’, and sees this as the characteristic
mode of reaction of the psycho-physical system. From this anticipation of the gestalt-psycholo-
gist’s position he arrives, long before Smuts, at an essentially holistic philosophy of a condi-
tioned purpose at the core of the world process.
In Hobhousian spirit, Thorpe was adept at making connections in an ever developing
intellectual universe. Here he noted how well this conception of the organism chimed
with the writings of the process philosopher Alfred North Whitehead and the systems
theorist Ludwig von Bertalannfy. And once one saw the organism in this new,
dynamic, driven, mind-over-matter way, then, Thorpe continued, not only did evolution
under natural selection appear less blind, but also its explanatory power increased mas-
sively, as one could nowmuch more plausibly, via the Baldwin effect, use it to explain the
evolution of complex instinctive behaviour patterns. Only at this point did Thorpe come
onto Fisher’s perspective on creative evolution, as offering still more motivation for
31 R.A. Fisher, Creative Aspects of Natural Law, Fourth Annual Arthur Stanley Eddington Memorial
Lecture, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 19. On the place of this lecture within Fisher’s oeuvre
see M.J.S. Hodge, ‘Biology and philosophy (including ideology): a study of Fisher and Wright’, in Hodge,
Before and after Darwin: Origins, Species, Cosmogonies, and Ontologies, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008, XIII,
esp. pp. 256–262. From the beginning of the Eddington lecture series in 1946 through to 1975, Thorpe was
chairman of the trustees; see Hinde, op. cit. (7), p. 631.
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dropping the blindness charge against natural selection. And in summarizing that per-
spective, Thorpe gave it a Hobhousian gloss:
we may say that the natural selection process is creative in the full meaning of the word, and
that evolution involves a non-deterministic agent acting through the whole ecological
complex of life and its environment. This, moreover, implies to my mind that if we can
discern a purpose in the agent, there must also be a Purposer.
He brought the lecture to a close by observing, apropos of amorality, that only those
who saw evolution as ‘purposeless mechanism’ (in Julian Huxley’s phrase) up to the
emergence of moral humans have puzzles to contend with here.32
A couple of letters that Thorpe received on the text of the lecture, published the next
year, show that, at least for a couple of contemporaries, he did not succeed entirely in
reconciling his bullishness on neo-Darwinian natural selection theory with what other-
wise seemed his critical estimate of the limitations of that theory. In January 1951 he
received a letter from a Cambridge colleague, the naturalist, theologian and historian
of natural history Charles Raven. Raven congratulated Thorpe on a very lucid and
helpful presentation of the virtues of the latest version of Darwinian theory, declared
by Thorpe to be, as Raven quoted, ‘the only adequate mechanism of evolution
known’. Raven went on,
But having done so you then (as it seems to me) completely change the concept of organism.
You introduce an idea of creativity, holism, purpose so that ‘random’ ceases to mean merely
haphazard … and a concept of the organism quite different from what has dominated
biology [–] a concept clearly incompatible with the orthodox mechanistic view or (as I think)
with the use of random – for random can only mean non-teleological whereas you speak …
of ‘conditioned purpose.’ I expect the position can be easily cleared up but I am bound to
say to you what I said to Fisher that this new concept of the organism needs further explication.
If there is creativity in the organism, then Natural Selection falls into its place as a sifting
process. But this is not what it is claimed to be by Huxley or Darwin.33
Later that year, a Quaker theologian, Herbert G.Wood, sent a letter identifying a related
but different problem. On the one hand, wroteWood, Thorpe insisted that – to quote the
paper – ‘adaptive and orthogenetic trends cannot be explained in terms of any inward
drive of the organism or race’. But a little way on, Thorpe claimed that ‘the “drive”
of such an animal is as much a part of it as its structure’. ‘This looks to me as inconsist-
ent’, wrote Wood, ‘but is the point you are making this – that a drive must be assumed or
recognised, but does not explain as much as [Henri] Bergson & others claimed for it?’34
There is a sense in which Thorpe spent the rest of his writing life attempting to resolve
the difﬁculties touched on in these two letters. A major and indeed controversial part of
32 Thorpe, op. cit. (2), pp. 8–9, 11 (pamphlet), 13–14, 16 (article); T.H. Huxley and Julian Huxley,
Evolution and Ethics, 1893–1943, London: Pilot Press, 1947.
33 Letter from Charles Raven to W.H. Thorpe, 12 January 1951, Thorpe Papers, Box 8, Bundle i, Folder 1,
emphasis in original, quoting (inexactly) from Thorpe, op. cit. (2), pp. 5 (pamphlet), 10 (article).
34 Letter from Herbert G. Wood to W.H. Thorpe, 6 November 1951, Thorpe Papers, Box 6, ‘W’ sheaf,
quoting from Thorpe, op. cit. (2), pp. 4, 9 (pamphlet), 9, 14 (article). Even if Thorpe’s lecture failed to
satisfy all comers, it did him no harm professionally, at least to judge by his election in 1951 to the
Fellowship of the Royal Society.
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Learning and Instinct in Animals was devoted to expounding a biologically up-to-date
theory of animal drive. (The discussion of insight learning stretched across three chap-
ters.)35 And he remained ready to applaud and apply new scientiﬁc work tending to
show up Darwinian natural selection as less powerful than its propagandists said. The
neo-Lamarckian twist on the peppered moth example which I quoted at the outset,
from Science, Man and Morals, was not original to Thorpe but one he picked up from
the evolutionary-developmental biologist C.H. Waddington’s The Nature of Life
(1961).36 The chemist-turned-philosopher Michael Polanyi’s enthusiasm for emergence
in the same period quickened Thorpe’s interests in that alternative to gradualist
Darwinism, long familiar from the pages of Hobhouse and Morgan.37 Around the
time that Science, Man and Morals came out, Thorpe in a Nature review hymned the
praises of a 1965 book, Internal Factors in Evolution by Lancelot Law Whyte. In epit-
omizing Whyte’s case for how internal factors constrain natural selection, Thorpe
echoed Raven’s language (and Waddington’s title): ‘The nature of life limits its variation
and is one factor directing phylogeny. Thus the mutations of which the consequences
reach the Darwinian test have already been sifted by an internal selection process.’38
VI
As Fisher demonstrated, one could be a holistically inclined Christian Darwinian in mid-
century Britain and not be bothered in the slightest about animal agency and its scientiﬁc
neglect, or even about supposed tensions between mechanism and teleology. As we have
seen, those concerns became Thorpe’s thanks to scientiﬁcally formative contacts, not at
all shared by Fisher, with Lamarckian evolutionary biology and Hobhousian insight
psychology. Through the former, Thorpe learned that the formation of new habits
could be evolutionarily consequential; through the latter, that the minds behind those
habits could be treated as purposeful, and the results integrated into a broader picture
of – to quote the title of one of his ﬁnal books – purpose in a world of chance. In recon-
structing these features of Thorpe’s intellectual biography, I have drawn on some previ-
ously unexamined archived correspondence, without which their signiﬁcance can be
35 W.H. Thorpe, Learning and Instinct in Animals, London: Methuen, 1956.
36 C.H. Waddington, The Nature of Life, London: George Allen & Unwin, 1961, p. 90. Thorpe took
extensive notes (preserved in the archive: Thorpe Papers, Box 8, Bundle ii, Folder 1) on Waddington’s book
and cited it in Science, Man and Morals. On Waddington’s studies in the 1940s and 1950s of what he
called ‘genetic assimilation’, but widely interpreted ever since as a variant of the Baldwin effect, see Brian
K. Hall, ‘Baldwin and beyond: organic selection and genetic assimilation’, in Bruce H. Weber and David
J. Depew, Evolution and Learning: The Baldwin Effect Reconsidered, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003,
Chapter 8.
37 Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-critical Philosophy, Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press, 1962 (ﬁrst published 1958), pp. 382–404; Thorpe, op. cit. (1), pp. 20 ff. Documents preserved in
the archive show that Thorpe and Polanyi spoke in the same session at the 1959 annual conference of the British
Society for the Philosophy of Science and corresponded in the summer of 1962 about emergence in biology;
Thorpe Papers, Box 8, Bundle ii, Folder 1. On Thorpe on emergence see Neal C. Gillespie, ‘The interface of
natural theology and science in the ethology of W.H. Thorpe’, Journal of the History of Biology (1990) 23,
pp. 1–38, 8–10.
38 W.H. Thorpe, ‘Molecules and evolution’, Nature (1966) 210, pp. 663–664, 664.
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hard to spot. Thus a long and in other respects deeply researched 1990 article on the
links between Thorpe’s religious thought and scientiﬁc work by Neal Gillespie – until
now the only study of the subject – mentions Lamarckism and insight learning only in
passing, misses out Hobhouse entirely, and concludes that ‘[i]t was the requirements
of his natural theology more than the practical needs of his science that led Thorpe
away from mechanistic reductionism (as he characterized it) and toward holistic
biology’.39
Just as a closer tracking of Thorpe’s interactions with Lamarckism and, to give it a
name, Hobhousism illuminates his particular case, the reverse is also true. Again, the
pairing with Fisher is illuminating. Fisher had scientiﬁc dislikes, even hatreds. But The
Genetical Theory of Natural Selection is not a work of dissent from some needing-to-
be-overturned orthodoxy. It strengthened incipient orthodoxies across three mainstream
sciences – Darwinian evolutionary biology, Mendelian genetics and Galtonian eugenics
– by binding them together. (Reports of the ‘eclipse of Darwinism’ in the decades around
1900 are increasingly recognized as much exaggerated.) The further, easy ﬁt with a
rather conventional Anglican faith only underscores the extent to which Fisher’s achieve-
ment was, through and through, establishment science.40 By contrast, when Thorpe took
them up as his causes, the inheritance of acquired characters and the purposeful activity
of animal minds had around them an ambience of daring and subversion. Relatedly,
what he thus took up was deﬁned mainly negatively, in terms of what was being rejected.
These were protests against dismissiveness towards animal agency, on the part of post-
Weismannian Darwinians and post-Thorndikian behaviourists. Over the decades, he
remained true to that dual rejection while ceaselessly experimenting with the intellectual
resources best suited to articulating it (which, for the historian of science, makes his
oeuvre a remarkably full record of anti-reductionist science and philosophy in the twen-
tieth century).41 ‘Nonconformism’ – a standard label for the dissenting traditions within
Protestant English Christianity – works too for the modestly heretical scientiﬁc positions
that attracted the Congregationalist-turned-Quaker.
How far might such reﬂections on the category of ‘protest science’ be extended? One
could, if one wanted, describe all sciences as protests, against ignorance if not against
outright falsehoods, as well as, sometimes, against the authority fraudulently founded
on them. There is a serious sense in which Copernicus protested against Ptolemaic ortho-
doxy, Newton Cartesian orthodoxy, Darwin the orthodox theory of independent special
creation, Watson the introspectionist orthodoxy… But there is an equally serious sense
in which, for the sciences which count these men as begetters, the oppositional begin-
nings came to be transcended, to the point where it is now a job of work for historians
to recall those otherwise invisible beginnings. Proponents of the Modern Synthesis
version of natural-selection theory can give an account of what they believe without
39 Gillespie, op. cit. (37), 35.
40 See, in addition to Hodge, op. cit. (31), James R. Moore, ‘R.A. Fisher: a faith ﬁt for eugenics’, Studies in
History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences (2007) 38, pp. 110–135.
41 ‘Protest’ was a category invoked at the time, for example by Morgan in Emergent Evolution, op. cit. (6),
pp. 7–8: ‘the whole doctrine of emergence is a continued protest against mechanical interpretation, and the very
antithesis to one that is mechanistic’.
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having to criticize what they do not believe, much less rehearse the history of the debate
from which their science emerged. A protest science, we might say, never has that luxury,
or at least not yet. Its form is seemingly ﬁxed in oppositional mode, its content – for that
very reason (since what is rejected is more important than what is embraced) – perman-
ently ﬂuid, both in being hard to get hold of and in being prone to ﬂow onward, some-
times in multiple directions at once. Lamarckism since the late nineteenth century has
been a protest science par excellence. The science of animal agency, with Lamarckism
as one of its sources, has been, and remains, another. Thorpe’s peppered moths are
thus exemplary not just of the phenomena that fall within this science’s purview but
also, as neo-Darwinian icons treated with sacrilegious glee, of the deﬁnitional depend-
ency that is the calling card of protest science.42
Thorpe in protest mode made a lively impression on his contemporaries. In the late
1970s, Arthur Koestler, author of the era’s bestselling historical and philosophical
tracts against mechanical, reductionist science, hailed Thorpe as the spokesman for
the ‘hundreds of biologists’ over the previous quarter-century who had come to reject
neo-Darwinism and the dogmatic purposelessness it insisted upon.43 Over the quarter-
century that followed, the reputation of the Modern Synthesis for standing in the way
of a better, agency-friendly evolutionary biology only grew.44 But so, curiously
enough, did awareness of a theoretical option that theModern Synthesis had made avail-
able to its opponents on that front. The ‘Baldwin effect’was so named by the great palae-
ontological synthesist G.G. Simpson, in a 1953 review essay surveying a decade of work
that had accumulated after Huxley’s discussion in Evolution: The Modern Synthesis. As
Simpson showed, the possibility of heritable but non-Lamarckian ﬁxation of learned,
adaptive behaviours had received little attention from the time of its 1890s inaugural
moment until Huxley wrote. Huxley regarded the principle as ‘an important one
which would appear to have been unduly neglected’. Simpson, by contrast, judged it a
not-very-important variant form of natural selection – and certainly nothing unsettling
for the Synthetic theory.45 Although Simpson’s deﬂationist view prevailed into the
1980s, the Baldwin effect since that time has become an increasingly standard option
42 I ﬁrst considered Lamarckism along these lines in a review essay, Gregory Radick, ‘Deviance, Darwinian
style’, Metascience (2005) 14, pp. 453–457.
43 Arthur Koestler, Janus: A Summing Up, London: Hutchinson, 1978, quotation from Thorpe on p. 165.
On Koestler’s admiring relations with the anti-reductionist scientists of the era –many of them gathered in 1968
in Alpbach for the famous Beyond Reductionism symposium, which Thorpe chaired (the quotation is from his
opening remarks) – see James F. Stark, ‘Anti-reductionism at the conﬂuence of philosophy and science: Arthur
Koestler and the biological periphery’, Notes and Records of the Royal Society (2016) 70, pp. 269–286.
44 See, for example, Richard C. Lewontin, ‘Gene, organism, and environment’, in D.S. Bendall (ed.),
Evolution from Molecules to Men, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985, pp. 273–285; and more
expansively Lewontin, The Triple Helix: Gene, Organism, and Environment, Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 2000. Niche constructionism and developmental systems theory belong to the same family
of criticism. Recent indictments of the Modern Synthesis in this tradition include Peter A. Corning,
‘Evolution “on purpose”: how behaviour has shaped the evolutionary process’, Biological Journal of the
Linnean Society (2014) 112, pp. 242–260 and D.M. Walsh, Organisms, Agency, and Evolution,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015.
45 G.G. Simpson, ‘The Baldwin effect’, Evolution (1953) 7, pp. 110–117; Julian Huxley, Evolution: The
Modern Synthesis, London: Allen & Unwin, 1942, p. 524.
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for anyone wishing to theorize beyond the limits of Fisherian, population-genetical
Darwinism.46
What prompted Huxley to give the Baldwin effect such consequential prominence?
The short answer is: Thorpe.47 Around 1936–1937, when Huxley began to gather
material for the book that would give the Modern Synthesis its name, Thorpe’s research
on biological races entered its decisively post-Lamarckian phase. Huxley asked Thorpe
for a chapter on the topic for a 1940 collection on the new systematics.48 In Evolution:
The Modern Synthesis, in a chapter on speciation, Huxley – the most behaviourally
attuned of the Synthesists – devoted a lengthy section to ‘biological differentiation’, con-
centrating more or less exclusively on work either done or discussed by Thorpe. It was
here that Huxley provided his main exposition of what he called, interchangeably,
‘organic selection’ and ‘the Baldwin and Lloyd Morgan principle’.49 Thorpe – who
appears not to have known any of those names before – found Huxley’s discussion clari-
fying, and made generous reference to it in a 1945 paper on animal learning and evolu-
tion that went further still in bringing the principle to the attention of neo-Darwinians
such as Simpson.50 If Thorpe came to feel uncomfortable with the place that animal
agency ultimately occupied in the Modern Synthesis, it was not for want of trying,
and even, in a small but seemingly permanent way, succeeding. Anyone concerned not
to treat the Modern Synthesis as a monolith could do worse than remember Thorpe’s
example.51
46 On the Baldwin effect’s scientiﬁc trajectory see the papers gathered in Weber and Depew, op. cit. (36);
and also a review essay on the volume by Kim Sterelny, ‘Baldwin effects’, Evolution and Development
(2004) 6, pp. 295–300.
47 On Thorpe and the Baldwin effect see the brief but excellent discussion in Gillespie, op. cit. (37), pp. 30–
31. Oddly, the otherwise comprehensive Weber and Depew volume, op. cit. (36), includes just one minor and
misleading mention of Thorpe (p. 143).
48 Huxley recounted the origins of what became Evolution: The Modern Synthesis in Huxley, op. cit. (45),
p. 7. Correspondence from March 1938 preserved in the Julian Huxley archive at Rice University, Texas,
shows that Thorpe was already at work then on the chapter for Huxley’s New Systematics volume,
published as Thorpe, ‘Ecology’, op. cit. (21). Many thanks to Emily Herring for sharing copies of these
letters with me.
49 Huxley, op. cit. (45), pp. 295–308, 296.
50 Thorpe, ‘Animal learning’, op. cit. (21); Thorpe, ‘Evolutionary signiﬁcance’, op. cit. (21) (the former is a
precis of the latter). For Thorpe’s sense of the paper’s importance, in explaining how ‘recent developments in
genetics and in the study of animal learning make the Baldwin concept at once more probable and easier to
understand’, see Thorpe, op. cit. (35), pp. 256–258, 257. Simpson, distinguishing an animal’s selecting of its
environment from the Baldwin effect strictu sensu, cited Thorpe’s paper as linking the two by showing how
‘[s]election of the environment may … be a ﬁrst step in the Baldwin effect.’ Simpson, op. cit. (45), p. 111.
51 The pluralism of the Modern Synthesis has been a general theme in the historiography of recent decades,
beautifully encapsulated in David Depew and Bruce Weber’s line about the Synthesis being ‘more like a treaty
than a theory’. David Depew and Bruce Weber,Darwinism Evolving: Systems Dynamics and the Genealogy of
Natural Selection, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995, p. 300. On behaviour’s lack of full integration into the
Synthesis, the prize one-liner is considerably older. In a 1957 review of Thorpe’s Learning and Instinct in
Animals, the Glasgow zoologist S.A. Barnett wrote, ‘It was once said of certain investigations of population
dynamics that the animals concerned did not behave at all: they merely numbered off from the right.’ S.A.
Barnett, ‘The new ethology’, New Biology (1957) 24, pp. 118–124, 118, emphasis in original.
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